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mar 30
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POŽELJNOST REGULATIVNE FUNKCIJE SUDSKE VLASTI

Goran Dajović

10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22204A
SAŽETAK /

Rasprava se sastoji iz dva dela i u njima se, respektivno, zastupaju dve osnovne teze. Prva je da sudske presude u svim razvijenim pravnim sistemima mogu da budu „izvori“ opštih pravila koja će ubuduće na obavezujući način regulisati ponašanje sudova, a onda, sledstveno, i drugih pravnih subjekata, čak i ako nisu formalno priznate kao izvori prava. A druga je da one to treba da budu iz više razloga, od kojih su najvažniji predvidljivost i jednakost. U ovom delu rasprave najpre se izlažu upravo ti normativni razlozi u prilog vršenja regulativne funkcije sudske vlasti, a zatim se pokazuje u kojem pravcu bi sudska vlast mogla da vrši regulativnu funkciju u jednom tipičnom kontinentalnom sistemu, ako sudska vlast, kao celina, prihvata da je vrši.

ČLANAK JE RASPOLOŽIV NA /
Ćirilici   Latinici  
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