Članak
dec 24
Nazad

LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING

Torben Spaak

10.51204/Anali_PFBU_21405A
SAŽETAK /

In this paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more on problems of legal reasoning. This is a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but also, a field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to the study and the practice of law. Neither legal practitioners nor legal scholars reason with the same care and precision as philosophers do. Against this background, I suggest that the following three types of questions regarding legal reasoning are especially worthy of serious consideration. The first is that of the relevance of the theory of reasons holism to legal reasoning. The second is the question of how to analyze (first-order) legal statements in a way that does not undermine the rationality of legal reasoning. And the third is the question of whether legal arguments are to be understood as deductive arguments, inductive arguments, or both, and if so how.

ČLANAK JE RASPOLOŽIV NA /
Engleskom  
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