Članak
mar 30
Nazad

MOGUĆNOST REGULATIVNE FUNKCIJE SUDSKE VLASTI

Goran Dajović

10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22108A
SAŽETAK /

Rasprava se sastoji iz dva dela. U njima se, respektivno, zastupaju dve osnovne teze. Prva je da sudske presude u razvijenim pravnim sistemima mogu da budu „izvori“ opštih pravila koja na obavezujući način regulišu odlučivanje sudova, a onda, sledstveno, i drugih pravnih subjekata, čak i ako nisu formalno priznate kao izvori prava. Druga je da one to treba da budu iz više razloga, od kojih su najvažniji predvidljivost i jednakost. U prvom delu rasprave se razmatraju koncepti podele vlasti, vrsta državnih funkcija i sudske vlasti. Zatim se izlažu
ra­zlozi zbog kojih sudska vlast može da vrši regulativnu funkciju i u pravnom sistemu u kojem joj ona nije formalno priznata. Najzad, kao ilustracija kako funkcioniše sistem u kojem sudovi vrše regulativnu funkciju, opisuje se primena doktrine stare decisis u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, a u dodatku se analizira nekoliko odluka Ustavnog suda Srbije koje ukazuju na postojanja slične prakse u našem pravnom sistemu.

ČLANAK JE RASPOLOŽIV NA /
Ćirilici   Latinici  
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