Članak
jun 30
Nazad

EMPIRIJSKO ISTRAŽIVANJE EFEKTA UOKVIRAVANJA KAO VIDA KOGNITIVNE PRISTRASNOSTI

Aleksandar S. Mojašević

10.5937/AnaliPFB1902083M
SAŽETAK /

U radu se prikazuju tipične kognitivne pristrasnosti predstavnika pravnih profesija (sudija, arbitara, advokata, medijatora) i drugih učesnika sudskog (parničnog) postupka (porotnika, parničnih stranaka). Poseban deo rada posvećen je teoriji izgleda i efektu uokviravanja zbog njihovog značaja za proučavanje i predviđanje ponašanja stranaka u postupku. S tim u vezi, sprovedeno je empirijsko istraživanje na uzorku studenata prava. Pošli smo od toga da između grupe tužilaca i tuženih postoji značajna razlika u izboru poravnanja u parnicama sa umerenom ili visokom verovatnoćom dobitaka ili gubitaka, odnosno parnicama sa niskom verovatnoćom dobitaka ili gubitaka. Rezultati istraživanja potvrđuju da su ispitanici podložni efektu uokviravanja samo u parnicama sa umerenom ili visokom verovatnoćom dobitaka ili gubitaka. To istraživanje otvara i određena pitanja, a pre svega ko je u najboljoj poziciji da utiče na okvir u kojem stranke odlučuju. Autor iznosi stav da su, uprkos određenim ograničenjima, u takvoj poziciji medijatori.

ČLANAK JE RASPOLOŽIV NA /
Ćirilici   Latinici  
REFERENCE /
  • Anderson, C. John, David Lowe i Philip Reckers. 1993. Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap. Journal of Economic Psychology 14: 711–737.
  • Babcock, Linda i George Loewenstein. 1997. Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11: 109–126.
  • Bebchuk, Lucian A. i Andrew Guzman. 1996. How Would You Like to Pay for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms. Harvard Negotiation Law Review 1: 53–63.
  • Camerer, Colin i Richard H. Thaler. 1995. Anomalies, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners. The Journal of Eco-nomic Perspectives 9: 209–219.
  • Carnevale, Peter J. i Dean G. Pruitt. 1992. Negotiation and Mediation. Annual Reviews Psychology 43: 532–582.
  • Coursey, Don L. i Linda R. Stanley. 1988. Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence. International Review of Law and Economics 8: 161–179.
  • Eisenberg, Theodore. 1994. Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases. Washington University Law Review 72: 979–995.
  • Forsyth, Donelson R. 2007. Self-Serving Bias. 429 u International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. Wil-liam A. Darity. Detroit: Macmillan Reference.
  • Franck, Susan D., Anne van Aaken, James Freda, Chris Guthrie i Jeffrey J. Rachlinski. 2017. Inside the Arbitra-tor’s Mind. Emory Law Journal 66: 1115–1173.
  • Gilson, Ronald J. i Robert H. Mnookin. 1994. Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation. Columbia Law Review 94: 509–566.
  • Gross, Samuel R. i Kent D. Syverud. 1991. Getting To No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial. Michigan Law Review 90: 319–393.
  • Guthrie, Chris. 2000. Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory. The University of Chicago Law Re-view 67: 163–216.
  • Guthrie, Chris, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski i Andrew J. Wictrich. 2001. Inside the Judicial Mind. Cornell Law Review 86: 777–830.
  • Jolls, Christine, Cass R. Sunstein i Richard H. Thaler. 1998. A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics. Stan-ford Law Review 50: 1471–1550.
  • Kahneman, Daniel i Amos Tversky. 1972. Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness. Cognitive Psychology 3: 430–454.
  • Kahneman, Daniel i Amos Tversky. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47: 263–292.
  • Kahneman, Daniel i Amos Tversky. 1984. Choices, Values, and Frames. American Psychologist 39: 341–350.
  • Kahneman, Daniel. 1992. Reference Points, Anchors, Norms and Mixed Feelings. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51: 296–312.
  • Kamin, Kim A. i Jeffrey J. Rachlinski. 1995. Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight. Law and Hu-man Behavior 19: 89–104.
  • Kaneman, Daniel. 2015. Misliti brzo i sporo. Smederevo: Heliks.
  • Korobkin, Russell i Chris Guthrie. 1994a. Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way. The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 10: 1–22.
  • Korobkin, Russell i Chris Guthrie. 1994b. Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Ap-proach. Michigan Law Review 93: 107–192.
  • Landsman, Stephan i Richard F. Rakos. 1994. Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Infor-mation on Judges and Juries in Civil Litigation. Behavioral Science and the Law 12: 113–126.
  • Lawless, Robert M., Jennifer K. Robbennolt i Thomas S. Ulen. 2010. Empirical Methods in Law. New York: As-pen Publisher.
  • Miller, Geoffrey P. 1987. Some Agency Problems in Settlement. Journal of Legal Studies 16: 189–215.
  • Ministarstvo pravde Republike Srbije. 2018. Najveći broj medijacija iz oblasti bankarskih usluga, lizinga i osigura-nja. https://www.mpravde.gov.rs/vest/21396/najveci-broj-medijacija-iz-oblasti-bankarskih-usluga-lizinga-i-osiguranja-.php (poslednji pristup 10. mart 2019).
  • Munsinger, Harry L. i Donald R. Philbin. 2017. Why Can’t They Settle? The Psychology of Relational Disputes. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 18: 311–362.
  • Polinsky, Mitchell i Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2002. A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Com-pensating Lawyers. International Review of Law and Economics 22: 217–225.
  • Posner, Richard A. 1988. The Jurisprudence of Skepticism. Michigan Law Review 86: 827–891.
  • Rachlinski, Jeffrey J. 1996. Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation. Southern California Law Review 70: 113–185.
  • Rickman, Neil. 1999. Contingent Fees and Litigation Settlement. International Review of Law and Economics 19: 295–317.
  • Ross, Lee, David Greene i Pamela House. 1977. The „False Consensus Effect“: An Egocentric Bias in Social Per-ception and Attributional Processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13: 279–301.
  • Samson, Alain (ed.). 2018. The Behavioral Economics Guide 2018. https://www.behavioraleconomics.com (poslednji pristup 11. jul 2018).
  • Simon, Herbert A. 1992. What is an ‘Explanation’ of Behavior? Psychological Science 3: 150–161.
  • Smith, William P. 1985. Effectiveness of the Biased Mediator. Negotiation Journal 1: 363–372.
  • Tversky, Amos i Daniel Kahneman. 1974. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science 185: 1124–1131.
  • Tversky, Amos i Daniel Kahneman. 1992. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertain-ty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5: 297–323.
  • Van Koppen, Peter J. 1990. Risk Taking in Civil Law Negotiations. Law and Human Behavior 14: 151–165.
  • Viscusi, W. Kipp, 1999. How Do Judges Think About Risk? American Law and Economics Review 1: 26–62.
  • Wissler, Roselle L., Allen J. Hart i Michael J. Saks. 1999. Decisionmaking about General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers. Michigan Law Review 98: 751–826.