Članak
sep 27
Nazad

DIGESTIVE JURISPRUDENCE RESTATED: ON BREAKFAST AND DIGESTION AS BIAS-AROUSERS

Giovanni Tuzet

10.51204/Anali_PFBU_23301A
SAŽETAK /

“Digestive Jurisprudence” is the view that judicial decisions depend on what judges had for breakfast. The view is usually associated with Frank’s version of Legal Realism. The paper shows that, disputable as it is, that view comes from the philosophical background of Peirce’s pragmatism and the legal background of Holmes’ prediction theory. Peirce’s pragmatism was an account of concepts in terms of their predictable consequences. Holmes’ prediction theory was an account of law in terms of predictions of what judges will do. And Legal Realism focused on judicial behavior as determined by various factors including, in its most extreme and provocative version, breakfast quality and digestive processes. The paper does not ascertain whether the digestive view is true (to some extent); rather, it makes the working hypothesis that breakfast quality, or digestion quality, is not a sufficient condition of a certain outcome but, most likely, a bias-arouser.

ČLANAK JE RASPOLOŽIV NA /
Engleskom  
NAGRADE /
REFERENCE /
  1. CP: Peirce, C.S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce, 8 Vols., edited by Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss (Vols. 1–6) and Arthur W. Burks (Vols. 7–8). Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. The abbreviation is followed by volume and paragraph number.
  2. Almeder, Robert. 1979. Peirce on Meaning. Synthese, Vol. 41: 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869647
  3. Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making It Explicit. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Press.
  4. Brandom, Robert. 2000. Articulating Reasons. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674028739
  5. Canale, Damiano, Giovanni Tuzet. 2007. On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation? Ratio Juris, Vol. 20: 32–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00345.x
  6. Cohen, Felix S. 1937. The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 1: 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1937.tb00004.x
  7. Dahlman, Christian. 2004. Adjudicative and Epistemic Recognition. 229–242 in Analisi e diritto 2004, edited by Paolo Comanducci and Riccardo Guastini. Torino: Giappichelli.
  8. Danziger, Shai, Jonathan Levav, Liora Avnaim-Pessoa. 2011. Extraneous factors in judicial decisions. Pnas, Vol. 108: 6889–6892. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1018033108
  9. Derham, David. 1957. Judge Jerome Frank: An Australian Note of Appreciation. University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 24: 643–647.
  10. Fisch, Max H. 1942. Justice Holmes, the Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 39: 85–97. https://doi.org/10.2307/2018835
  11. Fisch, Max H. 1964. Was There a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge? 3–32 in Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Edward C. Moore and Richard S. Robin. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press.
  12. Frank, Jerome. 1930. Law and the Modern Mind. New York: Brentano’s.
  13. Frank, Jerome. 1948. Say It with Music. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 61(6): 921–957. https://doi.org/10.2307/1336139
  14. Frank, Jerome (ed.). 1949. Courts on Trial. Myth and Reality in American Justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  15. Glöckner, Andreas. 2016. The Irrational Hungry Judge Effect Revisited: Simulations Reveal that the Magnitude of the Effect is Overestimated. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 11(6): 601–610. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1930297500004812
  16. Grey, Thomas C. 1989. Holmes and Legal Pragmatism. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41: 787–870. https://doi.org/10.2307/1228740
  17. Guastini, Riccardo. 2011. Rule-Scepticism Restated, 138–161 in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 1, edited by Leslie Green and Brian Leiter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.003.0004
  18. Guthrie, Chris, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich. 2001 Inside the Judicial Mind. Cornell Law Review, Vol. 86: 777–830. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.257634
  19. Guthrie, Chris, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich. 2007 Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases. Cornell Law Review, Vol. 93:1–44.
  20. Haack, Susan. 2005. On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does “The Path of the Law” Lead Us? The American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 50: 71–105. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/50.1.71
  21. Haack, Susan (ed.). 2006. Pragmatism, Old & New. Selected Writings. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
  22. Haines, Charles G. 1922, General Observations of the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges. Illinois Law Review, Vol. 17: 96–116.
  23. Hart, H.L.A. 1994. The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  24. Holmes, Oliver W. [1881] 1963. The Common Law, edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.
  25. Holmes, Oliver W. 1897. The Path of the Law, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 10: 457–478. https://doi.org/10.2307/1322028
  26. Kozinski, Alex. 1993. What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 26: 993–999.
  27. La Mettrie, Julien O. de. 1996. Machine Man and Other Writings, edited by Ann Thomson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139166713
  28. Leiter, Brian. 1997. Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence. Texas Law Review, Vol. 76: 267–315.
  29. Leiter, Brian. 2007. Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206490.001.0001
  30. Menand, Louis. 2001. The Metaphysical Club. A Story of Ideas in America. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
  31. Miller, James D. 1975. Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 84: 1123–1140. https://doi.org/10.2307/795439
  32. Misak, Cheryl. 2013. The American Pragmatists. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  33. Misak, Cheryl. 2016. Cambridge Pragmatism. From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712077.001.0001
  34. Olivecrona, Karl. 1971. Law as Fact, 2nd ed. London: Steven & Sons.
  35. Pound, Roscoe. 1908. Mechanical Jurisprudence. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 8: 605–623. https://doi.org/10.2307/1108954
  36. Priel, Dan. 2008. Were the Legal Realists Legal Positivists? Law and Philosophy, Vol. 27: 309–350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-008-9021-2
  37. Priel, Dan. 2020. Law Is What the Judge Had for Breakfast: A Brief History of an Unpalatable Idea. Buffalo Law Review, vol. 68(3): 899–930.
  38. Quine, Willard van Orman. 1981. The Pragmatists’ Place in Empiricism. 21–39 in Pragmatism. Its Sources and Prospects, edited by Robert J. Mulvaney & Philip M. Zeltner. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
  39. Ross, Alf. 1958. On Law and Justice. London: Stevens & Sons.
  40. Schauer, Frederick. 2009. Thinking Like a Lawyer. A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674054561
  41. Troper, Michel. 2022. La philosophie du droit, Paris: PUF.
  42. Tuzet, Giovanni. 2013. What is Wrong with Legal Realism? 47–63 in The Planning Theory of Law. A Critical Reading, edited by Damiano Canale and Giovanni Tuzet. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4593-3_3
  43. Tuzet, Giovanni. 2018. Two Concepts of Experience: Singular and General. Pragmatism Today, Vol. 9(2): 132–144. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3481120
  44. Tuzet, Giovanni. 2021. Do Normative Predictions Make Sense? Pragmatism and Ethics in Calderoni, 90–114 in The Italian Pragmatists. Between Allies and Enemies, edited by Giovanni Maddalena and Giovanni Tuzet. Leiden–Boston: Brill–Rodopi. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004440876_006
  45. Vailati, Giovanni. 2010. Logic and Pragmatism, edited by Claudia Arrighi, Paola Cantù, Mauro de Zan and Patrick Suppes. Stanford: CSLI.
  46. White, Morton. 2004. Holmes and Hart on Prediction and Legal Obligation. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. XL: 569–573.