Članak
mar 30
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THE KLOBUCHAR BILL: IS SOMETHING ROTTEN IN THE US ANTITRUST LEGISLATIVE REFORM?

Nikola Ilić

10.51204/Anali_PFBU_22104A
SAŽETAK /

An intense public debate is currently taking place in the US. The main subject of this debate is tech giants and the antitrust law reform. The fundamental dilemma is whether giant corporations, such as Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Facebook, fit the traditional antitrust law or not. Senator Klobuchar proposed the new bill (the Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act) in 2021, and Congress is currently between a rock and a hard place. If Congress decides to support the New Brandeis movement and enact the bill, it could harm the tech giants and make the US start lagging behind China. If it decides otherwise, it could cause considerable dissatisfaction among US voters. This paper analyses the bill in detail and explores the possible outcomes. The conclusions suggest that enactment of the bill could have overwhelmingly adverse economic consequences for the competitiveness of US markets, innovation, and consequently for consumer welfare.

ČLANAK JE RASPOLOŽIV NA /
Engleskom  
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