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дец 20
Назад

US DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES: MANIFESTO OF IMPROVEMENTS OR STEP BACK?

Bojan RISTIĆ

10.51204/Anali_PFBU_23403A
САЖЕТАК /

This paper critically evaluates the draft version of the US Merger Guidelines from 2023 (D23), which departs from the consumer welfare standard, sparking intense debates within the academic, professional, and business communities. D23, released by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, introduces a shift toward a more structuralist approach in horizontal merger assessment. The paper examines the diverse perspectives of D23, with some perceiving it as a populist move sidelining economic rationale and others viewing it as an attempt to base decisions on factual grounds and enhance antitrust activism. The discussion emphasises the importance of precision in defining relevant markets within D23, a crucial element in merger assessment. This analysis sheds light on the evolving landscape of merger policy, prompting critical inquiries into the future trajectory of competition law.

ЧЛАНАК ЈЕ РАСПОЛОЖИВ НА /
Енглеском  
РЕФЕРЕНЦЕ /
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