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Jun 30
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EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE FRAMING EFFECT AS A COGNITIVE BIAS

Aleksandar S. Mojašević

10.5937/AnaliPFB1902083M
ABSTRACT /

The paper presents typical cognitive biases of legal professionals (judges, arbitrators, lawyers, mediators) and other participants in judicial (civil) proceedings (jurors, parties). A special part is devoted to prospect theory and the framing effect. In this regard, an empirical study was conducted on a sample of law students. We started from the fact that between the two groups there is a significant difference in the choice of settlement in litigation, with moderate or high likelihood of gains or losses, as well as in litigation with low likelihood of gains or losses. The results confirm that the respondents were susceptible to framing effect only in litigation with moderate/high probability of gains/losses. This study raises some questions, primarily who is in the best position to affect the framework within which the parties decide. The author expresses the view that, despite certain limitations, mediators are in such a position.

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